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EXCUSE ME, JUDGE, BUT YOU’RE STANDING IN THE WAY OF MY 
HEALTHCARE: THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA HALTS 
GROWTH OF MID-LEVEL HEALTH PROVIDERS AND DECLARES 
ONLY PHYSICIANS CAN OBTAIN PATIENT CONSENT  
IN SHINAL v. TOMS 
DANIEL MICHAEL BAKER* 
“[A Surgeon] is in the same complete charge of those who are present and 
assisting him as is the captain of a ship over all on board . . . .”1 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE ELEPHANT IN THE HOSPITAL WAITING ROOM 
It is difficult to go a day without hearing about “Obamacare” or “Trumpcare” 
and the turmoil of the seemingly endless political snafu.2  However, beyond the 
 
 *   J.D. Candidate, 2019, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law; B.A., 
2016, University of Wisconsin-Madison.  This Note is dedicated to my parents, Brad and 
Marianne Baker, and my sister, Katie, for supporting me in everything I do.  I would also like 
to thank everyone on the Villanova Law Review who helped me throughout the writing process. 
1.  McConnell v. Williams, 65 A.2d 243, 246 (Pa. 1949); see also Thomas v. 
Hutchinson, 275 A.2d 23, 27 (Pa. 1971) (holding “the ‘captain of the ship’ doctrine imposes 
liability on the surgeon in charge of an operation for the negligence of his assistants during the 
period when these assistants are under the surgeon’s control, even though the assistants are also 
employees of the hospital”).  For a further discussion of the “captain of the ship doctrine,” see 
infra note 148 and accompanying text.  
2.  See generally Robert H. Brader et al., Healthcare Legislation Outlook and Update, 
HOLLAND & KNIGHT (Aug. 1, 2017), 
https://www.hklaw.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Alerts/HealthcareLifeandSciences/0801201
7-HealthcareMemo.pdf [Permalink Unavailable] (summarizing recent U.S. Senate action on 
healthcare legislation and forecasting issues in Congress); Burgess Everett & Josh Dawsey, 
Senate GOP Tries One Last Time to Repeal Obamacare, POLITICO (Sept. 17, 2017, 02:51 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/09/17/obamacare-senate-republicans-repeal-242821 
[https://perma.cc/UN6R-EZB9] (outlining Republican attempt to repeal Obamacare after 
previous effort failed to garner the requisite Senate votes); Thomas Kaplan & Eileen Sullivan, 
Health Care Vote: Senate Rejects Repeal Without Replace, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/26/us/politics/health-care-senate-vote.html 
[https://perma.cc/W5T2-LY8S]; Scott Neuman, What’s Next in the Health Care Debate?, NPR 
(July 26, 2017, 08:34 PM), http://www.npr.org/2017/07/26/539615662/whats-next-in-the-
health-care-debate [https://perma.cc/9YWD-HVVE] (noting Republican attempt to pass 
“skinny repeal” that would remove certain provisions from Obamacare after wholesale repeal 
of the law was rejected in Congress); Robert Pear & Thomas Kaplan, Obamacare Repeal, 
Thought Dead in July, May Be Revived in Senate, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/18/us/politics/obamacare-repeal-vote.html 
[https://perma.cc/Z79N-BHY9] (summarizing the Senate’s refusal to repeal Obamacare without 
an agreeable replacement bill in place); Margot Sanger-Katz, One Reason to Take the Latest 
Obamacare Repeal Seriously, and Three Reasons it Could Fail, N.Y. TIMES: UPSHOT (Sept. 
19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/19/upshot/one-reason-to-take-the-latest-
obamacare-repeal-seriously-and-three-reasons-it-could-fail.html [https://perma.cc/QD6U-
4CKW] (noting that focal point of debate stems from disagreement over limitations placed on 
federal funds that are distributed to States for healthcare); Alex Tolbert, Is Obamacare Repeal 
Over? Three Possible Outcomes, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 16, 2017, 11:00 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/is-obamacare-repeal-over-three-possibleoutcomes_us 
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political jabs across the aisle and the debate on who is to pay for the costs, a more 
fundamental problem looms behind the curtain; there are simply not enough 
doctors in America.3  A 2017 independently-led research study from the 
Association of American Medical Colleges, for instance, projected that physician 
demand will grow faster than supply, with a “shortfall of between 40,800 and 
104,900 physicians by 2030.”4  More specifically, the study projected shortages 
of non-primary care specialties—including surgical specialties—of between 
33,500 and 61,800 by 2030.5  These projected shortages are the result of a 
growing and aging American population, along with the aging of the physician 
workforce.6  To address these problems, many scholars and health experts are 
calling for a reform of medical school education and increasing the number of 
residency programs.7  However, this solution has picked up little steam over the 
 
_59945d04e4b0eef7ad2c02da [https://perma.cc/AK2Z-LTA9] (speculating impact that 
healthcare debate will have on 2018 market). 
3. See IHS MARKIT, ASS’N AM. MED. COLLS., THE COMPLEXITIES OF PHYSICIAN 
SUPPLY AND DEMAND: PROJECTIONS FROM 2015 TO 2030 vii (Feb. 28, 2017), https://aamc-
black.global.ssl.fastly.net/production/media/filer_public/a5/c3/a5c3d565-14ec-48fb-974b-
99fafaeecb00/aamc_projections_update_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2VQ-X574] (projecting 
“total physician shortfall of between 40,800 and 104,900 physicians [in the United States] by 
2030”); Sarah Mann, New Research Shows Shortage of More than 100,000 Doctors by 2030, 
ASS’N AM. MED. COLLS. (Mar. 14, 2017), https://news.aamc.org/medical-education/ 
article/new-aamc-research-reaffirms-looming-physician-shor/ [https://perma.cc/8FFU-X84R] 
(suggesting a future physician shortage will result from “population growth, an increase in the 
number of aging Americans, and retirement of practicing doctors”); see also Mary Brophy 
Marcus, New Report Predicts “Troubling” Shortage of Doctors in the U.S., CBS NEWS (Mar. 
20, 2017, 04:24 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/doctor-shortage-us-impact-on-health/ 
[https://perma.cc/7UJL-G6RG] (explaining AAMC report and the potential effects). 
4. IHS MARKIT, supra note 3, at 3. 
5. See id. (describing the shortage of non-primary care specialties); see also Atul Grover 
et al., The Nation’s Physician Workforce and Future Challenges, 351 AM. J. MED. SCIS. 11, 15 
(2016) (“[S]urgical workforce is often key to ensuring rural hospitals remain open.  A national 
shortage of surgeons could accelerate maldistribution challenges.”). 
6. See IHS MARKIT, supra note 3, at 16 (stating number of Americans sixty-five and 
older is expected to grow by 55% by 2030, and number of Americans aged seventy-five and 
older is expected to grow by 73% percent); see also Grover et al., supra note 5, at 12 (“In a 
comparison of 11 industrialized nations’ experience, the U.S. number of practicing physicians 
per 1,000 population was second lowest at 2.5 . . . .”); E. Patchen Dellinger et al., The Aging 
Physician and the Medical Profession: A Review, 152 J. AM. MED. ASS’N SURGERY 967, 969 
(2017) (addressing need for policies to address the wellness and competence of aging physician 
workforce); Jeff Lyon, Congress to Address Shortage of General Surgeons, 316 J. AM. MED. 
ASS’N 1035, 1035 (2016) (discussing congressional efforts to place more general surgeons in 
rural areas, places with greatest need). 
7. See generally Michael Nedelman, Why Doesn’t the US Train More Doctors?, CNN 
(Mar. 14, 2017, 03:18 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/13/health/train-more-doctors-
residency/index.html [https://perma.cc/2NN2-63JJ] (explaining federal funds for medical 
residency programs “were capped by the 1997 Balanced Budget Act” and attempts to remove 
cap have been unsuccessful).  For a further discussion on proposed solutions to solve the 
physician shortage, see Ashley D. Meagher et al., Opportunities to Create New General Surgery 
Residency Programs to Alleviate the Shortage of General Surgeons, 91 ACAD. MED. 833, 833 
(2016) (“By creating new general surgery residency programs, hospitals could increase the 
number of general surgeons entering the workforce each year by 25%.”); Joshua Tierney & 
Kyla Terhune, Expanding the National Health Service Corps Scholarship Program to General 
Surgery: A Proposal to Address the National Shortage of General Surgeons in the United States, 
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years.8 
Instead, a popular solution has been to turn to Physician Assistants (PAs) 
and Nurse Practitioners (NPs)—two professions that have seen dramatic 
growth—to address the shortages.9  Several studies have demonstrated that a 
 
152 J. AM. MED. ASS’N SURGERY 315, 315 (2017) (proposing methods to incentivize potential 
physicians to choose general surgery); Sammy Caiola, Want a Medical Degree in Three Years? 
It’s an Option at UC Davis, Kaiser, SACRAMENTO BEE (July 3, 2017), 
http://www.sacbee.com/news/local/health-and-medicine/article159095509.html 
[https://perma.cc/3PJ5-RHDH] (describing UC Davis’s new fast track program for primary care 
doctors to graduate in three years, instead of four). 
8. See Tierney & Terhune, supra note 7, at 315 (noting that although medical schools 
have responded to the physician shortage with an increase in enrollment, there has not been a 
similar increase in the number of residency programs).  The programs remained capped by the 
Balanced Budget Act of 1997.  See id.  This act was “designed to establish 15,000 new residency 
positions over 5 years, was first introduced in 2009 but did not pass.”  Id.  The most recent 
version remains in committee.  See id. at 315; see also Jacqueline Belliveau, House Reps 
Address Physician Shortage in Medicare Residency Bill, REVCYCLE INTELLIGENCE (May 4, 
2017), https://revcycleintelligence.com/news/house-reps-address-physician-shortage-in-
medicare-residency-bill [https://perma.cc/U3UW-9GF8] (describing the Resident Physician 
Shortage Reduction Act that attempts to resolve physician shortage challenges by increasing 
the number of residencies with Medicare funds). 
9.  See Grover et al., supra note 5, at 14 (“[T]he nurse practitioner workforce is projected 
to nearly double between now and 2025 and the physician assistant workforce doubled during 
the previous decade and is on a continued growth trajectory . . . .” (citation omitted)); Kristin 
Ray et al., Trends in Visits to Specialist Physicians Involving Nurse Practitioners and Physician 
Assistants, 2001 to 2013, 177 J. AM. MED. ASS’N INTERNAL MED. 1213, 1216 (2017) (finding 
the involvement of nurse practitioners (NPs) and physician assistants (PAs) in the care of 
patients of specialist physicians has increased between 2001 and 2013).  PAs and NPs require 
advanced degrees, certification through series of exams, continued education, and 
recertification after a number of years, and various other responsibilities at the state level.  See 
Ray et al., supra, at 1216.  For more information on PAs and NPs, see Roderick S. Hooker et 
al., Characteristics of Nurse Practitioners and Physician Assistants in the United States, 28 J. 
AM. ASS’N NURSE PRACTITIONERS 39, 39 (2016) (“Their collective projected growth suggests 
a solution to emerging workforce shortages and an ability to help meet healthcare demands.”); 
see also Roderick S. Hooker et al., Similarities and Differences: Physician Assistants and Nurse 
Practitioners, 28 J. AM. ACAD. PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS 1, 1 (2015) (noting the trend towards 
substantial overlap in PA and NP roles is a potential solution to emerging physician workforce 
shortages); Amos Zehavi & Baruch Levi, Delegation of Physician Authority, Administrative 
Culture, and the Dynamics of Policy Adoption, 19 J. COMP. POL’Y ANALYSIS: RES. & PRAC. 
227, 230 (2016) (noting delegation of tasks to NPs and PAs).  For more information regarding 
the Pennsylvania State Senate bill pertaining to expanding NP authority, see S. 25, Reg. Sess. 
2017–18 (Pa. 2017) (purporting to grant NPs prescriptive authority and removing collaborative 
restrictions); see also Hilary Barnes, Evidence Supports Giving Nurse Practitioners Full 
Practice Authority, PENN LEONARD INST. OF HEALTH ECON.: HEALTH POLICY$ENSE (May 17, 
2016), https://ldi.upenn.edu/healthpolicysense/evidence-supports-giving-nurse-practitioners-
full-practice-authority [https://perma.cc/9V9C-W5C8] (discussing study finding removing 
collaborative agreement requirements for NPs would increase number of NPs in Pennsylvania 
by 13% and lower health care costs by $6.4 billion over the next ten years); KYLE JAEP & JOHN 
BAILEY, DUKE UNIV. SCH. OF L., THE VALUE OF FULL PRACTICE AUTHORITY FOR 
PENNSYLVANIA’S NURSE PRACTITIONERS: TECHNICAL APPENDIX 14  (July 2015), 
https://law.duke.edu/news/pdf/nurse_practitioners_report-PA-TechnicalAppendix.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/37TJ-MVK7] (suggesting “granting Pennsylvania’s nurse practitioners Full 
Practice Authority could potentially benefit Pennsylvanians by increasing access to comparable 
or better health care at lower costs”); Vicki Terwilliger, Bill Would Expand Would Expand Roles 
of Nurse Practitioners, POCONO REC. (Apr. 9, 2017, 08:02 PM), http://www. 
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broader scope of practice for PAs and NPs has increased access to health care and 
can potentially reduce costs, while having little effect on the quality of care.10  
Moreover, research has shown consumers are continually more open to the idea 
of expanded roles for mid-level professionals, such as PAs and NPs, notably for 
their patient education and communication skills.11  Further, studies have 
provided evidence that delegation of patient care duties can make hospitals more 
efficient and effective.12  The vast majority of PAs are involved in non-primary 
 
poconorecord.com/news/20170409/bill-would-expand-roles-of-nurse-practitioners [https://per 
ma.cc/78US-UQF3] (discussing Pennsylvania State Senate Bill 25). 
10. See Jeffrey C. Bauer, Nurse Practitioners as an Underutilized Resource for Health 
Reform: Evidence-Based Based Demonstrations of Cost-Effectiveness, 22 J. AM. ASS’N NURSE 
PRACTITIONERS 228, 231 (2010) (outlining advantages of NPs in healthcare delivery); Douglas 
M. Brock et al., Physician Assistant and Nurse Practitioner Malpractice Trends, MED. CARE 
RES. & REV., 2016, at 11 (concluding “PAs and NPs have lower reports of liability relative to 
their physician colleagues”); Sue Horrocks et al., Systematic Review of Whether Nurse 
Practitioners Working in Primary Care Can Provide Equivalent Care to Doctors, 324 BRITISH 
MED. J. 819, 819, 822 (2002) (concluding increasing NP involvement in primary care will result 
in greater levels of patient satisfaction and quality care); Ellen T. Kurtzman & Burt S. Barnow, 
A Comparison of Nurse Practitioners, Physician Assistants, and Primary Care Physicians’ 
Patterns of Practice and Quality of Care in Health Centers, 55 MED. CARE 618 (2017) (finding 
no statistical differences in outcome detected in NP or PA care compared to primary care 
medical physicians); Maartje G.H. Niezen & Jolanda J.P. Mathijssen, Reframing Professional 
Boundaries in Healthcare: A Systematic Review of Facilitators and Barriers to Task 
Reallocation from the Domain of Facilitators and Barriers to Task Reallocation from the 
Domain of Medicine to the Nursing Domain, 117 HEALTH POL’Y 151, 152 (2014) (discussing 
delegation of tasks to NPs); Edward J. Timmons, Healthcare License Turf Wars: The Effects of 
Expanded Nurse Practitioner and Physician Assistant Scope of Practice on Medicaid Patient 
Access 18 (Mercatus Ctr, Geo. Mason Univ. Working Paper, Jan. 2016), https://news-
center.aapa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2017/01/ Healthcare-License-Turf-
Wars_Timmons.pdf [https://perma.cc/YU5D-VERG] (finding relaxing occupational licensing 
requirements and broadening scope of practice may provide a low-cost alternative to provide 
quality care to the lower-income patients). 
11. See Michael J. Dill et al., Survey Shows Consumers Open to a Greater Role for 
Physician Assistants and Nurse Practitioners, 32 HEALTH AFFS. 1135, 1140 (2013) (finding 
patient openness to greater role for PAs and NPs); Dominick L. Frosch et al, Authoritarian 
Physicians and Patients’ Fear of Being Labeled “Difficult” Among Key Obstacles to Shared 
Decision Making, 31 HEALTH AFFS. 1030, 1034 (2012) (noting barrier to effective 
communication between physicians and patients); Kevin Grumbach & Thomas Bodenheimer,  
Can Health Care Teams Improve Primary Care Practice?, 291 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1245, 1250 
(2004) (“Nurse practitioners may also have better patient education and communication skills 
than do physicians.”).  Additionally, the Grumbach and Bodenheimer cited numerous studies 
that suggested multidisciplinary clinical teams produced clinical outcomes superior to those 
achieved by “usual care”.  See Grumbach & Bodenheimer, supra, at 1250; see also Roderick S. 
Hooker et al., Patient Satisfaction with Physician Assistant, Nurse Practitioner, and Physician 
Care: A National Survey of Medicare Beneficiaries, 12 J. CLINICAL OUTCOMES MGMT. 88, 90 
(2005) (concluding “[i]n our national cross-sectional satisfaction study comparing physician, 
PA, and NP primary care, in all indices of satisfaction PAs and NPs were rated as favorably as 
physicians”); Pauline W. Chen, M.D., Afraid to Speak Up at the Doctor’s Office, N.Y. TIMES: 
WELL (May 31, 2012, 12:01 AM), https://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/31/ afraid-to-speak-
up-at-the-doctors-office/ [https://perma.cc/779A-F6FA] (noting patients may feel that their 
physicians do not consider their perspective in the decision-making process). 
12. See Thomas S. Bodenheimer & Mark D. Smith, Primary Care: Proposed Solutions 
to the Physician Shortage Without Training More Physicians, 32 HEALTH AFFS. 1881, 1882 
(2013) (noting “[l]icensed practitioners . . . are seriously underused . . . [and n]onlicensed 
4
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care, specialty practice groups, including surgical practices.13  The delegation of 
duties to PAs and NPs will place a greater emphasis on team-based care, leading 
to more efficient and cost-effective results.14 
However, hospital delegation, as with other healthcare innovation, attempts 
to strike a balance between making hospitals more efficient and effective, without 
 
health care personnel . . . are equally underused” and “[a]n effective team adds capacity by 
sharing the care between clinicians and nonclinicians”); Natalie Dies et al., Physician Assistants 
Reduce Resident Workload and Improve Care in an Academic Surgical Setting, 29 J. AM. 
ACAD. PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS 41, 41 (2016) (finding “PAs reduce resident workload and 
improve care on surgical teams in tertiary [referral] hospital”); see also ROBERT A. GABBAY ET 
AL., TEAM-BASED CARE: EVIDENCE FOR COST SAVINGS AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR 
HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES  1 (Dec. 19, 2011), http://www 
.americasagenda.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=xXJnYhPIE8Y%3D&tabid=236 
[https://perma.cc/38FB-RQ8F] (“[T]eam-based care enables physicians and other qualified 
healthcare providers to work with the patient and a multi-disciplinary team to coordinate and 
deliver high-quality health care across all settings.”); Roderick S. Hooker & Christine Everett, 
The Contributions of Physician Assistants in Primary Care Systems, 20 HEALTH SOC. CARE 
COMMUNITY 20, 28 (2012) (“Available evidence suggests that the care provided by PAs is safe, 
effective and satisfying to patients insofar as it is comparable to doctors.”); John K. Iglehart, 
Expanding the Role of Advanced Nurse Practitioners—Risks and Rewards, 368 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1935, 1940 (2013) (finding “progress in restructuring delivery systems may come more 
rapidly at the practice level, where physicians, nurses, and other caregivers are freer to innovate 
and to assign tasks to persons on the basis of the full extent of their training and what makes 
organizational sense”).  
13.  See NAT’L COMM’N OF CERTIFICATION OF PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS, 2016 
STATISTICAL PROFILE OF CERTIFIED PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS 15 (2017), 
https://prodcmsstoragesa.blob.core.windows.net/uploads/files/2016StatisticalProfileofCertifie
dPhysicianAssistants.pdf [https://perma.cc/NVL9-GT3N] (reporting 72.2% of PA’s were 
involved in non-primary care or specialty areas of practice and 27.8% were involved in either 
general or subspecialties surgery practices); see also American Academy of Physician 
Assistants, About Surgical Pas, AM. ACAD. OF PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS, 
http://www.aaspa.com/about-surgical-pas [https://perma.cc/83FU-V6F4] (last visited Nov. 15, 
2017) (“Surgical PAs handle many of the functions of a fully trained doctor, in the absence of 
a doctor, and exercise autonomy in medical decision-making.  All PAs work under the ultimate 
supervision of a licensed physician, who is responsible for all decisions made regarding patient 
care.”). 
14.  For more information regarding the duties of surgical PAs, see AM. ACAD. OF 
PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS, SPECIALTY PRACTICE: ISSUE BRIEF 2 (2011), www.aapa.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/ 12/SP_Surgery.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6N2-QYUF] (stating “PAs work 
in general surgery and in virtually every surgical specialty and subspecialty.  In addition to first 
and second assisting at surgery, PAs provide pre- and postoperative care, write orders and 
prescribe medication”).  For examples of team-based care and influence of PAs, see Charles 
Mains et al., Staff Commitment to Trauma Care Improves Mortality and Length of Stay at a 
Level 1 Trauma Center, 66 J. TRAUMA, INJURY, INFECTION & CRITICAL CARE 1315, 1319 
(2009) (concluding that adding PAs to a trauma center reduced overall mortality rates and 
shortened lengths of stays); see also Bruce Jaspen, Physician Assistants Moving into Specialties 
Amid Doctor Shortage, FORBES (July 14, 2016, 09:00 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucejapsen /2016/07/14/physician-assistants-moving-into-
specialties-amid-doctor shortage/#25ad48b458 74 [https://perma.cc/R7SN-WUEH] (quoting 
Dawn Morton-Rias of NCCPA by stating “[o]ne part of the value equation is cost, and PAs are 
cost-effective providers of high quality care” and “[w]hile the PA salary is competitive, it is 
much less than a physician, particularly in the surgical specialties”); GABBAY, supra note 12, 
at 1 (“[T]eam-based care enables physicians and other qualified healthcare providers to work 
with the patient and a multi-disciplinary team to coordinate and deliver high-quality health care 
across all settings . . . .”).  
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sacrificing patient care.15  The law serves to draw these tough lines between 
efficiency and patient safety, and this dilemma has become especially prominent 
in the area of informed consent.16  The doctrine of informed consent lies at the 
heart of the patient-provider relationship, as well as a patient’s autonomy over his 
or her life and well-being.17  The doctrine requires the physician to disclose 
enough information about the risks and benefits of the proposed treatment so that 
a patient becomes sufficiently informed to participate in the shared 
decision-making process.18 
The issue of informed consent was tackled head on by the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania in Shinal v. Toms,19 where hospital delegation and the doctrine of 
 
15.  See Georgia M. Beasley et al., Procedure Delegation by Attending Surgeons 
Performing Concurrent Operations in Academic Medical Centers: Balancing Safety and 
Efficiency, 261 ANNALS SURGERY 1044, 1045 (2015) (“Safety supersedes productivity.  
Nevertheless, improved health care delivery is a national priority that requires objective 
consideration.”); Alex Bowen et al., Nurse Led Discharge: Improving Efficiency, Safely, 19 
CLINICAL GOVERNANCE INT’L J. 110, 111 (2014) (discussing how delegation of nurse-led 
discharge can improve efficiency of patient discharge by providing services outside of usual 
time periods and allowing discharges ahead of schedule, resulting in an elimination of 
unnecessary discharge delays); Irene Fraser et al., Improving Efficiency and Value in Health 
Care: Introduction, 43 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1781, 1781 (2008) (highlighting seven different 
papers writing on efficiency, value, and safety in healthcare systems); Brian J. Lichtenstein et 
al., The Effect of Physician Delegation to Other Health Care Providers on the Quality of Care 
for Geriatric Conditions, 63 J. AM. GERIATRIC SOC’Y 2164, 2170 (2015) (finding “[t]he 
delegation of specific processes for the management of urinary incontinence, dementia, and 
falls, to lower level providers is associated with higher quality care . . . [, and] efficiency and 
quality can be improved through team care with increased delegation”).  For more information 
on the difficulties of healthcare innovation, see Vincent K. Omachonu & Norman G. Einspruch, 
Innovation in Healthcare Delivery Systems: A Conceptual Framework, 15 INNOVATION J.: PUB. 
SECTOR INNOVATION J. 1, 6 (2010) (discussing the need for healthcare innovation to meet the 
challenges of labor); see also Regina E. Herzlinger, Why Innovation in Health Care Is So Hard, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (May 2006), https://hbr.org/2006/05/why-innovation-in-health-care-is-so-
hard [https://perma.cc/9MP5-WSBF] (arguing that despite advances in medical treatment, the 
delivery of the treatment is often inefficient, ineffective, and not consumer friendly). 
16. For a further discussion on the definition of informed consent in healthcare, see infra 
notes 33–37 and accompanying text.  Informed consent is used in both hospital and healthcare 
provider patient settings, as well as in clinical trials and research settings.  This Note will solely 
focus on informed consent in hospital/healthcare provider settings.  For further discussion on 
informed consent issues in research settings, see, e.g., Umesh Chandra Gupta, Informed Consent 
in Clinical Research: Revisiting Few Concepts and Areas, 4 PERSP. CLINICAL RES. 26, 26 
(2013) (noting that informed consent consists of three essential elements “including 
voluntarism, information disclosure, and decision-making capacity”); Marilyn J. Hammer, 
Informed Consent in the Changing Landscape of Research, 43 ONCOLOGY NURSING F. 558, 
558 (2016) (discussing the need for an individual in a clinical trial to understand “the 
requirements, risks, and benefits of the trial”); Lokesh P. Nijhawan et al., Informed Consent: 
Issues and Challenges, 4 J. ADVANCED PHARM. TECH. & RES. 134, 138–39 (2013) (discussing 
the challenges of informed consent in research context). 
17.  See JESSICA W. BERG ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL 
PRACTICE 18 (2d ed. 2001) (“The primary goals of informed consent are the protection of 
patient or subject welfare and the promotion of autonomy.”).  
18. See, e.g., Bryan Murray, Informed Consent: What Must a Physician Disclose to a 
Patient?, 14 AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 563, 564 (2012) (describing basic requirements of 
informed consent doctrine). 
19. 162 A.3d 429 (Pa. 2017). 
6
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informed consent came to a clash.20  In a 4-3 opinion, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania held that a physician may not delegate an obligation to provide 
sufficient information in order to obtain a patient’s informed consent to an NP or 
PA.21  In arriving at this holding, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated that 
the duty to obtain informed consent lies strictly with the physician, and there 
needs to be direct face-to-face communication between the physician and the 
patient.22  The decision applies to the procedures listed in the Medical Care 
Availability and Reduction Error Act (MCARE), including: performing surgery, 
administrating radiation or chemotherapy, administrating a blood transfusion, 
inserting a surgical device or appliance, or administering an experimental 
medication, experimental device, or an approved medication or experimental 
device.23  The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania expressly overruled Foflygen v. 
Allegheny General Hospital24 and Bulman v. Myers,25 which previously allowed 
information communicated between qualified professionals and patients, acting 
under a physician’s supervision, to be considered in regard to finding informed 
consent.26  Shinal will have a major impact on how physicians and health 
providers across the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania obtain informed consent 
and may force many health systems to change or modify their compliance 
procedures.27 
This Note analyzes the majority’s method of statutory interpretation and digs 
deeper into the current state of healthcare delegation, current medical research on 
hospital delivery systems, and the rise of PAs and NPs in the form of team-based 
care.28  Part II of this Note highlights the background of informed consent and 
 
20. See id. at 429 (describing context of case). 
21. See id. at 455 (explaining Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s holding).  
22. See id.  The holding also puts into question the continued use of using video 
instruction as a tool to obtain informed consent.  See Kristina Cordasco et al., Obtaining 
Informed Consent from Patients: Brief Update Review, in MAKING HEALTHCARE SAFER II: AN 
UPDATED CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EVIDENCE FOR PATIENT SAFETY PRACTICES 461, 461, 
464–65 (2013) https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/72d9/ 
13bac76f2de9850b76d383d949aa3072915d.pdf?_ga=2.165438136.644384802.1526331087-
2028589986.1520109019 [https://perma.cc/U6UB-34LY] (discussing the effectiveness of 
supplemental written material and video education tools). 
23. See 40 PA CONS. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.504(a) (West 2017) 
(describing which procedures are included under the statute).  Because of the variety of 
procedures in which the MCARE Act applies to, the words “physician” and “surgeon” are used 
interchangeably.  
24. 723 A.2d 705 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999).   
25. 467 A.2d 1353 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983). 
26. See Foflygen, 723 A.2d at 711 (allowing jury to consider information given by 
surgeon’s nurse, along with what was discussed between patient and surgeon in determining 
whether physician fulfilled duty to obtain informed consent); Bulman, 467 A.2d at 1355 
(holding information communicated to patient by qualified professional acting under doctor’s 
supervision may be considered when determining whether physician fulfilled duty to obtain 
informed consent).  For a further discussion on the background and holdings of Foflygen and 
Bulman, see infra notes 50–55 and accompanying text.  
27.  For a further discussion on the impact of Shinal, see infra notes 164–73173 and 
accompanying text. 
28. For a critical analysis of the court’s reasoning in Shinal, see infra notes 125–64 and 
accompanying text. 
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the history of informed consent in Pennsylvania before Shinal.29  Part III 
describes the facts, procedural history, holding, and dissent in Shinal.30  Part IV 
analyzes the majority reasoning and considers the holding as a matter of statutory 
interpretation, as well as a matter of public policy.31  Finally, Part V of this Note 
examines the impact of Shinal on informed consent and predicts the future of 
informed consent in Pennsylvania.32 
II. DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS? THE HISTORY OF INFORMED CONSENT  
IN PENNSYLVANIA 
The doctrine of “[i]nformed consent refers to the legal rules that prescribe 
behaviors for physicians and other healthcare professionals in their interactions 
with patients and provide for penalties, under given circumstances.”33  The 
doctrine focuses on patient autonomy—a patient’s consent is “informed,” and 
thus the doctrine satisfied if the patient is given enough information to make an 
informed choice.34  Patients generally know very little about medicine; thus, the 
physician must act as an educator by adequately informing the patient of the risks 
and benefits of a medical operation and ensuring that the patient can make a 
knowledgeable decision on how to proceed.35 
Originally, litigation surrounding whether a physician obtained patient 
consent was focused on the tort of battery—an intentional, unconsented, 
offensive touching.36  Although some courts have moved away from the use of 
 
29. For a further discussion of the development of informed consent in Pennsylvania, 
see infra notes 40–60 and accompanying text. 
30. For a further discussion of the facts, procedural history, and reasoning in Shinal, see 
infra notes 70–123 and accompanying text. 
31. For a critical analysis of the court’s reasoning in Shinal, see infra notes 124–63 and 
accompanying text.  
32. For a further discussion of the impact of Shinal, see infra notes 164–73 and 
accompanying text. 
33. BERG, supra note 17, at 3. 
34. See Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (Cardozo, 
J.) (“Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be 
done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s consent 
commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.” (citation omitted)); BERG, supra note 
17, at 18 (“The primary goals of informed consent are the protection of patient or subject welfare 
and the promotion of autonomy.”). 
35. See Murray, supra note 18, at 563 (explaining doctrine of informed consent). 
36. See generally BERG, supra note 17, at 42 (discussing origins of informed consent in 
eighteenth century English law in Slater v. Baker & Stapleton, where the court held that because 
it was professional custom among surgeons to obtain patients consent before beginning surgery, 
court found it only fair to impose liability on surgeon who failed to meet this professional 
standard); George P. Smith, II, The Vagaries of Informed Consent, 1 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 109, 
115 (2004) (noting “under older case law, the duty to obtain informed consent for a medical 
intervention was inherent in the essential idea that nonconsensual touching was, and is, a legal 
battery”).  See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 101 (AM. LAW INST. 2015).  
Under the Restatement: 
An actor is subject to liability to another for battery if: 
 
(a) the actor intends to cause a contact with the person of the other, as provided in § 
102, or the actor’s intent is sufficient under § 110 (transferred intent); 
8
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battery and have instead used negligence law to solve consent disputes, other 
states, including Pennsylvania, have continued to conceptualize the issue in terms 
of an unconsented touching.37 
A. Pennsylvania Courts and Informed Consent 
In Pennsylvania, the doctrine of informed consent has been developed 
through the common law.38  Pennsylvania’s earliest conception of informed 
consent emerged in 1932, in the case Moscicki v. Shor.39  There, the Superior 
Court of Pennsylvania held that a medical operation without the consent of a 
mentally-competent patient performed in nonemergency circumstances 
constituted a “technical assault,” which, in modern nomenclature, would be 
considered an unconsented touching.40 
 
(b) the actor’s affirmative conduct causes such a contact; 
(c) the contact (i) causes bodily harm to the other or (ii) is offensive, as provided in 
§ 103; and 
(d) the other does not effectively consent to the otherwise tortious conduct of the 
actor, as provided in § 111. 
Id. 
37. See Joan P. Dailey, The Two Schools of Thought and Informed Consent Doctrines 
in Pennsylvania: A Model for Integration, 98 DICK. L. REV. 713, 727–28 (1994) (explaining 
that battery theory of liability fell out of favor because courts recognized that doctors “rarely 
intend to injure . . . patients,” the doctrine of battery “exposes physicians to liability regardless 
of whether the patient was physically injured as a result of the procedure,” and the courts 
understood the “injustice of a liability theory which prevents recovery when a patient has 
consented to an operation after receiving insufficient information with which to make an 
intelligent consent”).  But see Shinal v. Toms, 162 A.3d 429, 452 (Pa. 2017) (“The doctrine of 
informed consent developed through the common law under the theory that a surgery conducted 
without consent was a battery . . . and that, to be effective, a patient’s consent must be informed, 
i.e., based upon adequate information . . . .  Without the patient’s informed consent, the 
physician is liable for the procedure, regardless of whether the physician was negligent.” 
(internal citations omitted)); Cooper ex rel. Cooper v. Lankenau Hosp., 51 A.3d 183, 191 (Pa. 
2012) (“Similarly well-established is the proposition that claims alleging a lack of consent for 
a surgical procedure constitute a battery committed upon a patient by a physician.” (citation 
omitted)); Montgomery v. Bazaz-Sehgal, 798 A.2d 742, 748–49 (Pa. 2002) (noting “[T]his 
Court has made clear on repeated occasions over a period of several decades that a claim based 
upon a lack of informed consent involves a battery committed upon a patient by a physician, an 
action which is distinct from a claim of a consented-to, but negligently performed, medical 
treatment”); Duttry v. Patterson, 771 A.2d 1255, 1258 (Pa. 2001) (“A claim that a physician 
failed to obtain the patient’s informed consent sounds in battery.” (citation omitted)); Morgan 
v. MacPhail, 704 A.2d 617, 620 (Pa. 1997) (refusing to adapt a negligence standard and holding 
“[i]t is the invasive nature of the surgical or operative procedure involving a surgical cut and 
the use of surgical instruments that gives rise to the need to inform the patient of risks prior to 
surgery” (citation omitted)).  
38. See A.D. Burnett III, Suturing the Loophole: Informed Consent As a Requirement 
for Procedures Not Enumerated in Pennsylvania’s Medical Informed Consent Statute, 108 
PENN ST. L. REV. 1249, 1252–55 (2004) (tracing the history of informed consent in the common 
law). 
39. 163 A. 341 (Pa. Super Ct. 1932). 
40. See id. at 343 (noting that the plaintiff consented to the eventual removal of all of 
her teeth, but insisted that half of the extractions be performed at a later date).  While the patient 
was anesthetized, the physician removed all twenty-three of her teeth.  See id. at 341 (holding 
that without consent, the procedure constituted a technical assault); see also Burnett, supra note 
9
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More than thirty years later, the doctrine of informed consent was solidified 
in Gray v. Grunnagle.41  The Gray court held that informed consent consisted of 
a “true understanding of the nature of the operation to be performed, the 
seriousness of it, the organs of the body involved, the disease or incapacity sought 
to be cured, and the possible results.”42  The holding viewed informed consent in 
a contractual light, as an agreement between the physician and the patient of a 
clear understanding of the undertaking.43  The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s 
ruling in Gray has been classified as the “formal birth of informed consent in 
Pennsylvania.”44 
Following the lead from Gray, the superior court in Cooper v. Roberts45 
rejected the “medical community practitioner standard” in favor of a reasonable 
patient standard.46  The change in standard required the physician to disclose all 
facts, risks, and alternatives that a reasonable patient in the situation would want 
to know before proceeding.47  The superior court’s analysis further cemented the 
doctrine of informed consent in a patient’s individual physical integrity.48  
Subsequent Pennsylvania courts have followed Gray, solidifying that the purpose 
of the doctrine is to ensure a patient has enough material information to determine 
whether to proceed with a surgical operation.49 
 
38, at 1252 (“Informed consent in Pennsylvania originated from the notion that a doctor was 
required to obtain a patient’s consent before surgery lest the doctor be liable under a claim of 
battery, as first reported in Moscicki v. Shor in 1932.” (citation omitted)). 
41. 223 A.2d 663, 664–67 (Pa. 1966).  The patient underwent an exploratory spinal 
column examination.  See id. at 665.  The patient consented to the operation, but testified he 
was never informed as to the possibility of the paralysis that ensued.  See id. at 673–74.  
42. Id. at 674 (internal quotations omitted). 
43. See id. (discussing the contractual nature of the relationship between a physician 
and a patient). 
44. Burnett, supra note 38, at 1253. 
45. 286 A.2d 647 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1971).  In Cooper, the patient “sought damages for the 
perforation of her stomach in the performance of a gastroscopic examination.”  Id. at 648.  The 
patient alleged she was not informed of any collateral risks that could occur from the procedure.  
See id. at 651. 
46. See id. at 650 (“As the patient must bear the expense, pain and suffering of any 
injury from medical treatment, his right to know all material facts pertaining to the proposed 
treatment cannot be dependent upon the self-imposed standards of the medical profession.”). 
47. See id. at 650–51 (declaring the change in standard for informed consent cases). 
48. See id. at 649–50 (relying on the holding from Gray). 
49. See Sinclair v. Block, 633 A.2d 1137, 1140 (Pa. 1993) (“The goal of the informed 
consent doctrine is to provide the patient with material information necessary to determine 
whether to proceed with the . . . procedure or to remain in the present condition.” (citations 
omitted)); Gouse v. Cassel, 615 A.2d 331, 333 (Pa. 1992) (holding “a physician or surgeon who 
fails to advise a patient of material facts, risks, complications and alternatives to surgery which 
a reasonable man in the patient’s position would have considered significant in deciding 
whether to have the operation is liable for damages which ensue”); Rowinsky v. Sperling, 681 
A.2d 785, 789 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (“The goal of the informed consent doctrine is to provide 
the patient with material information which is necessary to determine whether or not to proceed 
with the surgical procedure.” (citation omitted)); see also Cooper, 286 A.2d at 650 (invoking a 
“reasonable patient standard” to determine what information is material and must be disclosed). 
10
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B. Pennsylvania Informed Consent Doctrine and Delegation 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania 
have also considered the physician’s delegation of informed consent.50  Two 
superior court cases directly addressed the question of whether a jury could 
consider the information given by a member of a physician’s staff when 
considering if informed consent had been given to a patient.51  In Bulman, the 
superior court allowed a jury to consider information given by the nurse assistant 
when determining whether the plaintiff-patient gave informed consent.52  The 
superior court held that the most important consideration in determining whether 
informed consent is valid is the scope of the information provided, not the person 
communicating that information.53 
Similarly, the superior court in Foflygen allowed a jury to consider 
information given by a surgeon’s nurse, along with what was discussed between 
the patient and surgeon, in an informed consent case.54  Echoing Bulman, the 
superior court held that validity of a patient’s consent is based on the scope of the 
information given, not on the identity of the individual communicating the 
information.55 
In Valles v. Albert Einstein Medical Center,56 the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania held that a medical facility does not control the manner in which a 
physician performs the duty to obtain informed consent.57  Therefore, the court 
held that the duty rests with the physician, and the hospital cannot be vicariously 
liable for the breach of that duty.58  In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania noted that a battery resulting from lack of informed consent is 
“not the type of action that occurs within the scope of employment.”59  
Furthermore, the court asserted that it did not want to inject the hospital into the 
 
50. For a further discussion on the noted cases, see infra notes 51–60.  
51. See Foflygen v. Allegheny Gen. Hosp., 723 A.2d 705, 707–11 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) 
(concerning patient who suffered stroke after a gastric-bypass surgery and alleged the surgery 
was performed without her consent); Bulman v. Myers, 467 A.2d 1353, 1354–55 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1983) (concerning patient alleging trespass action against dentist for injuries sustained as 
result of a surgery to remove molars, alleging surgery was performed without her informed 
consent). 
52. See Bulman, 467 A.2d at 1355–56 (discussing holding of case). 
53. See id. at 1355 (agreeing with Justice Takiff’s opinion in Gray and holding that the 
main concern is whether the patient is informed of all the material facts to make surgical 
decision). 
54. See Foflygen, 723 A.2d at 711 (concluding “that the trial court properly instructed 
the jury to consider the information presented by Appellee-surgeon’s nurse along with that 
discussed by Appellee-surgeon when deliberating on the informed consent issue” (citation 
omitted)). 
55.   See id. (holding focus of informed consent is on information provided, not on 
exactly who provides information). 
56.  805 A.2d 1232 (Pa. 2002). 
57.  See id. at 1239 (describing holding of the case). 
58. See id. (rejecting hospital’s vicarious liability defense and holding that informed 
consent does not require discussion of the manner or method of surgery). 
59. Id. 
11
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relationship between a physician and patient.60 
C. The Pennsylvania General Assembly and Informed Consent 
In 1997, Pennsylvania codified the case law on informed consent in the 
Health Care Services Malpractice Act (HCSMA), which was later revised in 2002 
as the Medical Care Availability and Reduction Error Act (MCARE).61  These 
bills were passed in response to the medical malpractice crisis in Pennsylvania.62  
The informed consent doctrine is specifically codified under chapter five of the 
MCARE Act.63  The statute declares that “a physician owes a duty to a patient to 
obtain the informed consent of the patient or the patient’s authorized 
representative” before performing surgery.64  Further, the statute declares that 
 
60. See id. (“We decline to interject an element of a hospital’s control into this highly 
individualized and dynamic relationship.”); Shelley S. Fraser, Hospital Liability: Drawing a 
Fine Line with Informed Consent in Today’s Evolving Health Care Arena, 1 IND. HEALTH L. 
REV. 253, 258–60 (2004) (discussing holding in Valles); see also Kelly v. Methodist Hosp., 664 
A.2d 148, 151 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (noting hospital should not be liable for physician’s failure 
to obtain informed consent due to personal relationship between physician and patient). 
61.  See 40 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1301.101–1004 (West 2017); Health 
Care Services Malpractice Act, 1996 Pa. Laws 776, §§ 1, 10 (describing revised statute and 
change in language); Brief for the American Medical Association and the Pennsylvania Medical 
Society as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee at 20, Shinal v. Toms, 2016 WL 7245376 (Pa. 
2016) (No. 31 MAP 2016).  For a further discussion of the revised statute and change in 
wording, see infra notes 140–44 and accompanying text. 
62. See 40 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.102 (stating statute’s purpose). 
(1) It is the purpose of this act to ensure that medical care is available in this 
Commonwealth through a comprehensive and high-quality health care system.  
(2) Access to a full spectrum of hospital services and to highly trained physicians in 
all specialties must be available across this Commonwealth.  
(3) To maintain this system, medical professional liability insurance has to be 
obtainable at an affordable and reasonable cost in every geographic region of this 
Commonwealth.  
(4) A person who has sustained injury or death as a result of medical negligence by 
a health care provider must be afforded a prompt determination and fair 
compensation.  
(5) Every effort must be made to reduce and eliminate medical errors by identifying 
problems and implementing solutions that promote patient safety. 
(6) Recognition and furtherance of all of these elements is essential to the public 
health, safety and welfare of all the citizens of Pennsylvania. 
Id.; see also Brief for the Hospital & Health System Association of Pennsylvania as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Appellee at 23 n.9, Shinal v. Toms, 2016 WL 7245377 (Pa. 2016) (No. 31 
MAP 2016) (“The MCARE Act was passed at the height of a medical malpractice crisis in 
Pennsylvania—marked by soaring malpractice premiums, and an exodus of insurers and 
physicians in high risk specialties from the Commonwealth—in an attempt to combat and 
reverse the potentially disastrous impact of the crisis on Pennsylvania’s public health and 
economy”); Bryan J. Warren, Comment, Pennsylvania Medical Informed Consent Law: A 
Call to Protect Patient Autonomy Rights by Abandoning the Battery Approach, 38 DUQ. L. 
REV. 917, 940 (2000) (discussing Pennsylvania’s informed consent statute).  
63. See 40 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.504. 
64. Id. § 1303.504(a)(1). 
(a) Duty of physicians.—Except in emergencies, a physician owes a duty to a patient 
to obtain the informed consent of the patient or the patient’s authorized representative 
prior to conducting the following procedures: 
12
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“[c]onsent is informed if the patient has been given a description of a 
procedure . . . and the risks and alternatives that a reasonably prudent patient 
would require to make an informed decision as to that procedure.”65 
MCARE holds physicians—not PAs or NPs—responsible for obtaining 
informed consent.66  Under the statute, the physician retains ultimate liability for 
a failure to obtain informed consent.67  However, nothing in the statute expressly 
precludes physicians from delegating the duty in obtaining informed consent to 
other medical professionals, as seen in Bulman and Foflygen.68  Consequently, in 
a time of increased delegation to mid-level healthcare professionals and an 
emphasis on team-based care, the lack of certainty on whether a physician can 
delegate the duty to obtain informed consent set the stage for the inevitable clash 
in Shinal.69 
 
(1) Performing surgery, including the related administration of anesthesia. 
Id. 
65. Id. § 1303.504(b). 
66. See id. § 1303.504(a), (b) (explaining duty is on physician to obtain informed 
consent). 
67.   See 40 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.504(d).  The ultimate liability 
section resembles the captain of the ship doctrine.  See Thomas v. Hutchinson, 275 A.2d 23, 
27 (Pa. 1971) (describing the captain of the ship doctrine).  See generally 1 TIMOTHY B. 
ADELMAN, HEALTH L. PRAC. GUIDE § 12:22 (2017) (“Borrowed servant and ‘Captain of the 
Ship’ doctrines”); JOHN KIMPFLEN & JEANE PHILBIN, 3 SUMM. PA. JUR. 2D TORTS § 37:51 
(2d ed. 2017) (“Captain of the ship doctrine”); 3 S. GERALD LITVIN & GERALD AUSTIN 
MCHUGH, JR., WEST’S PA. PRAC., TORTS: LAW AND ADVOCACY § 7.8 (2016) (“Vicarious 
liability within the operating room—Captain of the ship doctrine”). 
68. For a further discussion of statutory interpretation of the MCARE Act, see infra 
notes 125–49 and accompanying text; see also Statutory Construction Act (SCA), 1 PA. STAT. 
AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921 (West 2017) (guiding Pennsylvania courts in statutory 
interpretation issues).  For case law interpreting the SCA and more generally interpreting 
statutes, see, e.g., In re Borough of Downingtown, 161 A.3d 844, 871 (Pa. 2017); Scungio 
Borst & Assocs. v. 410 Shurs Lane Developers, LLC, 146 A.3d 232, 237–40 (Pa. 2017); 
Metro. Edison Co. v. City of Reading, 162 A.3d 414, 421–22 (Pa. 2017); Johnson v. Lansdale 
Borough, 146 A.3d 696, 711 (Pa. 2016); Sugarhouse HSP Gaming, L.P. v. Pa. Gaming 
Control Bd., 162 A.3d 353, 375–77 (Pa. 2016); Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Cumberland Coal, 102 
A.3d 962, 975 (Pa. 2014); Burke v. Indep. Blue Cross, 103 A.3d 1267, 1274 (Pa. 2014); 
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 26 A.3d 1078, 1090 (Pa. 2011); Pa. Sch. Bds. Ass’n v. Pub. Sch. 
Emps. Ret. Bd., 863 A.2d 432, 436–39 (Pa. 2004); Fonner v. Shandon, Inc., 724 A.2d 903, 
907 (Pa. 1999); Commonwealth v. Rieck Inv. Corp., 213 A.2d 277, 282 (Pa. 1965); 
Commonwealth v. Cahill, 95 A.3d 298, 303 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014). 
69. See Shinal v. Toms, 162 A.3d 429, 441–43 (Pa. 2017) (describing conflict and 
differing lower court rulings applying MCARE Act).  For further commentary on the case, see 
Max Mitchell, In Wake of Informed Consent Ruling, Med Mal Lawyers Raising Questions, 
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Aug. 4, 2017), http://www.thelegalintelligencer.com/id= 
1202794800155/In-Wake-of-Informed-Consent-Ruling-Med-Mal-Lawyers-Raising-Questions 
[https://perma.cc/LX2C-SD7P]; Zack Needles, Doctors Must Obtain Informed Consent 
Themselves, Justices Rule, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (June 22, 2017), http://www. 
thelegalintelligencer.com/id=1202790888045/Doctors-Must-Obtain-Informed-Consent-
Themselves-Justices-Rule [https://perma.cc/P2TB-CNFK]; Andis Robeznieks, 
Informed-Consent Ruling May Have “Far-Reaching, Negative Impact”, AM. MED. ASS’N: 
PRACTICE MGMT. (Aug. 8, 2017), https://wire.ama-assn.org/practice-management/informed-
consent-ruling-may-have-far-reaching-negative-impact [https://perma.cc/HPF5-8ZAL]; S.Y. 
Tan, Shinal v. Toms: It’s Now Harder to Get Informed Consent, MD EDGE: INTERNAL MED. 
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III. THE CONJOINING OF DELEGATION AND INFORMED CONSENT: THE SUPREME 
COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA PREPARES FOR OPERATION IN SHINAL V. TOMS 
In June 2017, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided whether a 
physician could delegate the duty to obtain a patient’s informed consent.70  The 
court held that a physician could not delegate to qualified staff in fulfilling the 
duty under chapter five of the MCARE Act.71  Therefore, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania reversed Bulman and Foflygen, holding that physicians—and only 
physicians—must obtain informed consent directly with a patient and shifted the 
central importance from the information being provided to the person delivering 
the information.72 
 
A. Informed Consent Delegation Meets the MCARE Act: Facts and Procedure 
in Shinal 
On November 26, 2007, Megan L. Shinal met with Dr. Steven A. Toms, 
M.D, Director of the Department of Neurosurgery at Geisinger Medical Center, 
in Danville, Pennsylvania.73  In an initial consultation, Shinal and Toms discussed 
removing a recurrent, non-malignant tumor from the pituitary region of Shinal’s 
brain.74  According to Toms’s testimony, he discussed Shinal’s life goals and the 
 
NEWS (Sept. 10, 2017), 
http://www.mdedge.com/internalmedicinenews/article/146691/business-medicine/shinal-v-
toms-its-now-harder-get-informed [https://perma.cc/8LYD-VRUX]; Tucker Arensberg, P.C., 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Rules That Only Physicians—Not Their Staff—Can Obtain 
Informed Consent, JD SUPRA (June 30, 2017), https://www.jdsupra.com/ 
legalnews/pennsylvania-supreme-court-rules-that-77026/ [https://perma.cc/5FYU-9C7K]; 
Kristen Andrews Wilson, Informed Consent Ruling May Affect Your Business, NAT’L L. REV. 
(June 29, 2017), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/informed-consent-ruling-may-affect-
your-business [https://perma.cc/RFM5-XUED]; see also Glenda Guest, Should Physicians be 
Solely Responsible for Informed Consent? One State Thinks So, ASS’N OF CLINICAL RES. 
PROFS. (Aug. 11, 2017), https://www.acrpnet.org/2017/08/11/physicians-solely-responsible-
informed-consent-one-state-thinks// [https://perma.cc/9D22-HLQN]; Jennifer Jordan, 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Decision on Shinal v. Toms, HOSP. HEALTH SYS. ASS’N OF PA. 
(June 30, 2017), https://www.haponline.org/Portals/0/docs/Bulletins/HAP/Jun/Pennsylvania-
Supreme-Court-Decision-on-Shinal-v-Toms.pdf?ver=2017-06-30-172305-067 
[https://perma.cc/S3QA-QSV4]. 
70. See Shinal, 162 A.3d at 429 (noting the issue for the court). 
71. See id. at 453 (“[A] physician cannot rely upon a subordinate to disclose the 
information required to obtain informed consent.”). 
72. See id. (“Without direct dialogue and a two-way exchange between the physician 
and patient, the physician cannot be confident that the patient comprehends the risks, benefits, 
likelihood of success, and alternatives.” (citation omitted)).  
73. See id. at 429, 433–35 (summarizing factual background of Shinal’s medical 
situation and initial meeting with Dr. Steven Toms). 
74. See id. at 433 (discussing Shinal’s medical history).  Shinal had surgery on the 
tumor years before but the surgeon at the time was unable to remove all of it by accessing the 
tumor through the nose.  See id.  Therefore, some of the tumor remained, and the remaining 
portion had grown in the years since the initial surgery, placing her long term-health at risk. 
See id. 
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risks associated with the different surgical options.75  Toms advised Shinal that a 
total resection of the tumor provided the greatest chance at long-term survival.76  
While Shinal agreed to proceed with the surgery, they had not yet determined 
whether she would undergo total or subtotal resection.77 
On December 19, 2007, Shinal spoke with Toms’s PA over the phone.78  
During this conversation, Shinal asked about any scarring from the surgery, 
possible follow-up radiation treatment, and the craniotomy incision.79  A little 
less than a month later, Shinal met with the PA at the neurosurgery clinic, where 
the PA interviewed Shinal on her medical history, performed a physical, and 
informed her about the surgery.80  “Shinal signed an informed consent form.”81  
However, at trial, Shinal testified that she could not remember whether she was 
“informed of the relative risks of the surgery, other than coma and death.”82  
Shinal “testified that, had she known the alternative approaches to surgery” and 
the differences between total versus subtotal resection, “she would have chosen 
subtotal resection as the safer, less aggressive alternative.”83 
On January 31, 2008, Shinal underwent surgery for a total resection of the 
brain tumor.84  During the surgery, Toms perforated, or pierced, Shinal’s carotid 
artery.85  The perforation resulted in a stroke, brain injury, and partial blindness.86 
On December 17, 2009, Shinal filed a medical malpractice lawsuit again 
Toms in the Court of Common Pleas of Montour County, Pennsylvania, alleging 
 
75. See id. (highlighting the twenty-minute conversation between Toms and Shinal 
prior to surgery).  When discussing various risks and life goals, Shinal expressed “that she 
wanted to ‘be there’ for her [nine-year old] child.”  Id. (citation omitted).  Toms took this “to 
mean that ‘she wanted [him] to push forward if [he] got in a situation where [he] thought [he] 
could [remove all of the tumor] with a reasonable risk.’”  Id. at 433–34 (citation omitted). 
76. See id. at 434 (describing the conversation between Toms and Shinal prior to 
surgery).  
77. See id. at 433 (citation omitted).  
78. See id. at 434 (explaining phone call between Shinal and the physician assistant). 
79. See id. (explaining content of phone conversation between Shinal and physician 
assistant).  
80. See id. (describing the meeting between Shinal and physician assistant and what 
was discussed). 
81. Id.  The informed consent form “acknowledged that Mrs. Shinal gave Dr. Toms 
permission to perform ‘a resection of recurrent craniopharyngioma,’ and identified the risks of 
the surgery as including ‘pain, scarring, bleeding, infection, breathing problems, heart attack, 
stroke, injury and death.’”  Id. at 434 n.1 (citation omitted).  The form also represented that 
Shinal had discussed the 
“advantages and disadvantages of alternative treatments,” that “[t]his form has been 
fully explained to me,” that Mrs. Shinal understood the form’s contents, that Mrs. 
Shinal had the opportunity to ask questions, and that Mrs. Shinal had sufficient 
information to give her informed consent to the operation.  The form did not purport 
to address the specific risks of total versus subtotal resection.  
Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
82. Id. at 434. 
83. Id. 
84. See id. (discussing surgical operation).  
85. See id. 
86. See id. 
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that she had not given informed obtain consent prior to the surgery.87  Shinal 
claimed that Toms did not inform her of the risks of surgery or explain that she 
could opt for subtotal resection combined with subsequent radiation treatments, 
which was the lower-risk option.88  At trial, on the matter of informed consent, 
the judge instructed the jury “as follows: ‘[I]n considering whether [Dr. Toms] 
provided informed consent to [Mrs. Shinal], you may consider any relevant 
information you find was communicated to [Mrs. Shinal] by any qualified person 
acting as an assistant to [Dr. Toms].’”89  “[T]he jury asked the court whether” 
PAs “could satisfy the informed consent requirements” laid out in the jury 
instruction.90  The trial court repeated its prior instruction to the jury.91 
“On April 21, 2014, the jury returned a verdict” for Toms.92  “Shinal[] 
appealed to the Superior Court,” which affirmed the trial court’s holding in favor 
of Toms.93  Shinal then appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.94  The 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that a physician may not delegate the duty 
to obtain informed consent, and that the duty requires face-to-face direct 
communication between the physician and the patient.95 
B. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Puts on Scrubs and Dissects Informed 
Consent Delegation Once and For All 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania began its analysis by briefly discussing 
the purposes and history of informed consent surrounding the protection of a 
patient’s bodily integrity and autonomy.96  The court highlighted the need for a 
“meeting of the minds” between a patient and physician—physicians “ha[ve] a 
duty to inform the patient about the risks, benefits, likelihood of success, and 
 
87. See id. (noting the legal action taken against Dr. Toms after the surgery). 
88. See id. at 435 (“The Shinals initially named as defendants Geisinger Medical 
Center, Geisinger Clinic, and Dr. Toms.  The parties agreed to bifurcate the issues of liability 
and damages.  The liability phase of the trial was to address solely the issue of whether Dr. 
Toms obtained Mrs. Shinal’s informed consent before surgery.”). 
89. Id. at 436 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
90. Id. 
91. See id. (describing jury’s questioning of definition of informed consent and who 
can provide the information). 
92. See id. (noting the trial court’s jury verdict for Toms). 
93. See id. at 437.  The superior court relied on Foflygen v. Allegheny General 
Hospital and Bulman v. Myers in holding that information communicated to a patient by a 
qualified professional acting under a doctor’s supervision may be considered for obtaining 
informed consent.  See id. at 438 (citations omitted). 
94. See id. at 436–38 (describing procedural history). 
95. See id. at 455. 
96. See id. at 452–53 (“The doctrine of informed consent protects a patient’s bodily 
integrity and autonomy in determining what medical treatment to allow.  The doctrine 
recognizes that a patient has the right to be informed by his or her physician of the risks and 
benefits attending a proposed course of treatment in order to enable the patient to make an 
informed decision about the treatment.  To ensure informed consent, the physician has a duty 
to inform the patient about the risks, benefits, likelihood of success, and alternatives.” 
(citation omitted)). 
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alternatives” of a particular operation.97  Following its analysis of the contractual 
relationship between patient and physician, the court’s analysis was split into two 
sections: a common law analysis and a statutory interpretation analysis.98 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania discussed Bulman and Foflygen, two 
superior court cases that allowed a jury to consider information provided by a 
surgeon’s qualified staff.99  The court contrasted the two lower court rulings with 
its decision in Valles, where it held that the duty to obtain informed consent rests 
only on the healthcare provider performing an operation and not on the 
hospital.100  Furthermore, the Valles court held the duty of disclosure lies only 
with the physician, stating the duty to obtain informed consent “belongs solely to 
the physician and that it is non-delegable.”101  Additionally, the court cited Kelly, 
explaining that due to nature of the physician-patient relationship, and the 
education of the surgeon, the surgeon is in the best position to obtain informed 
consent from a patient.102  Relying on the reasoning for separating informed 
consent liability between a physician and a hospital, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania took one step further and held that physicians cannot rely upon a 
subordinate to disclose information and fulfill the duty to obtain informed 
consent.103  The court noted the importance of the physician-patient relationship 
and that direct discussions between the surgeon and patient ensure a patient has 
a complete understanding of the procedure, risks, and alternatives, while 
upholding patient autonomy and bodily integrity.104 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania further reasoned that the common-law 
analysis was consistent with a plain reading of MCARE’s codification of 
 
97. Id. at 452 (citation omitted). 
98. See id. at 441–56. 
99. See id. at 453 (comparing the superior court’s holdings in Bulman and Foflygen). 
100. See id. (discussing the supreme court’s holding in Valles); see also Valles v. Albert 
Einstein Med. Ctr., 805 A.2d 1232, 1234 (Pa. 2002) (discussing that appellant claimed that 
Albert Einstein Medical Center and physician did not obtain informed consent of the patient, 
did not properly advise the patient of the risks of the dye used, and the alternatives that were 
available). 
101. Shinal, 162 A.3d at 453 (citing Valles, 805 A.2d at 1239). 
102. See id. at 453 (citing Kelly v. Methodist Hosp., 664 A.2d 148, 151 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1995)) (explaining physician in best position to know patient medical history and explain risks 
of particular operations).  In discussing the difference in liabilities, the Kelly court stated:  
[i]t is the surgeon and not the hospital who has the education, training and experience 
necessary to advise each patient of risks associated with the proposed surgery.  
Likewise, by virtue of his relationship with the patient, the physician is in the best 
position to know the patient’s medical history and to evaluate and explain the risks 
of a particular operation in light of the particular medical history. 
Kelly, 664 A.2d at 151. 
103. See Shinal, 162 A.3d at 453 (“Without direct dialogue and a two-way exchange 
between the physician and patient, the physician cannot be confident that the patient 
comprehends the risks, benefits, likelihood of success, and alternatives.” (citation omitted)).  
104. See id. at 453–54 (explaining Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s reasoning in 
expanding holding in Valles to physician’s subordinates). 
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informed consent.105  The court stated that nothing in the statute suggests that a 
physician can delegate the duty, and the focus of the statute is on who is giving 
the information directly to the patient and not just on who is receiving the 
information.106  Beyond the plain language of the statute, the majority reasoned 
that requiring direct communication between a physician and patient would serve 
the purpose of the MCARE Act in reducing costs of malpractice insurance.107 
Additionally, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reasoned that Toms’s 
testimony was consistent with both the supreme court’s holdings in Valles and 
the court’s interpretation of the MCARE Act.108  Toms spoke of informed consent 
as “‘a real compact between the surgeon and the patient.’”109  Speaking on the 
idea of delegation, Toms stated: “‘Truly, we’re not allowed to have a [physician 
assistant] or a resident physician [review the procedure with the patient], I have 
to do it, I have to hear it, I have to know it.’”110 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ultimately held that a physician may 
not delegate the obligation to provide sufficient information to obtain a patient’s 
informed consent.111  The court held the duty to obtain informed consent lies 
solely with the physician, who needs to give direct face-to-face communication 
to the patient in order to fulfill his or her duty.112  The supreme court, therefore, 
overruled Bulman and Foflygen, which had previously allowed a fact-finder to 
consider information given by a physician’s subordinate when determining 
whether a physician had fulfilled the obligation to obtain informed consent.113 
C. “Let’s Stick to the Law”: The Dissent’s Response to the Supreme Court’s 
Reasoning 
Justice Baer wrote the dissenting opinion, joined by two other justices, as he 
believed there was nothing in Pennsylvania law that directly prevented a 
physician from using qualified staff in fulfilling a physician’s duty to obtain 
 
105. See id. at 454 (determining the plain language meaning of section 504 of 
MCARE Act).  The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that section 504 does not suggest a 
physician can delegate the duty the duty to a subordinate to obtain informed consent.  See id. 
106. See id. at 454 (interpreting section 504 of MCARE Act). 
107. See id. at 454 n.28 (citing general objective of the MCARE Act).  The Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania noted, “increased communication between the physician and patient 
relative to informed consent, as opposed to the physician’s delegation of communication to an 
agent or employee, enhances patient satisfaction, reduces the risk of litigation, and is 
consonant with the legislative goal of reducing malpractice costs.”  Id.  
108.   See id. at 454–55 (discussing Toms’s testimony about informed consent). 
109. Id. at 455 (citation omitted). 
110. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
111. See id. (“We hold that a physician may not delegate to others his or her 
obligation to provide sufficient information in order to obtain a patient’s informed consent.”). 
112. See id. 
113. See id. (“To the extent that [Bulman and Foflygen] permit a physician to fulfill 
through an intermediary the duty to provide sufficient information to obtain a patient’s 
informed consent, we overrule them.”).  
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informed consent.114  Justice Baer based his argument on statutory interpretation 
and public policy.115  Justice Baer made clear that he agreed with the majority 
that a physician could not completely delegate the duty to obtain informed 
consent, as the physician would still ultimately be liable, but argued that a 
physician may use qualified staff to help the physician fulfill this duty.116 
In regards to the statutory interpretation of the MCARE Act, Justice Baer 
argued that the statute does not explicitly mandate that only physicians can 
provide information to obtain patient consent.117  Justice Baer stressed that the 
Pennsylvania General Assembly could have expressly required that physicians 
were the only ones who could provide information to obtain patients informed 
consent, but the general assembly chose to leave the statute in the passive form.118  
Therefore, the statute provided physicians with discretion in fulfilling the duty to 
obtain informed consent.119 
Furthermore, Justice Baer disagreed with the majority as a matter of public 
policy.120  The dissent stated that the majority’s holding “improperly injects the 
judiciary into the day-to-day tasks of physicians such as Dr. Toms and fails to 
acknowledge the reality of the practice of medicine.”121  Justice Baer argued that 
physicians would now have to be involved in every step of a patient’s informed 
consent, which would lead to negative consequences, such as longer lines and 
delayed care.122  In sum, the dissent asserted that unless the general assembly and 
law say otherwise, the courts should not unduly interfere the day-to-day tasks of 
 
114. See id. at 457 (Baer, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority and stating that 
a jury should be allowed to consider relevant information communicated to a patient by any 
qualified person under a physician).  Justice Baer agreed with the majority that a physician 
cannot simply delegate the duty and avoid liability.  See id.  However, he believed a physician 
could delegate the duty, while still maintaining liability.  See id.  Justice Bear stated the law 
on the duty to inform is “indisputable.”  See id.  Chief Justice Saylor and Justice Mundy 
joined in the dissent.  See id. 
115. See id. at 458. 
116. See id. at 457 (claiming majority “makes a leap in logic and concludes that a 
physician is prohibited from utilizing his qualified staff to aid him in performing this duty”). 
117. See id. at 457–58 (arguing that the MCARE Act gives physicians discretion on 
how to fulfill the duty to obtain informed consent).  Justice Baer indicated that the statute 
states “[c]onsent is informed if the patient has been given a description of a procedure set 
forth in subsection (a) and the risks and alternatives that a reasonably prudent patient would 
require to make an informed decision as to that procedure,” but does not explicitly state that 
only physicians can provide information to obtain informed consent.  See id. at 458, 458 n.2 
(quoting 40 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.504(b) (West 2017)). 
118. See id. at 458 n. 2 (“[T]he Legislature crafted the first sentence of Subsection 
1303.504(b) in passive voice, thus leaving open the method of informing a patient’s consent to 
the professional judgment and discretion of the physician charged with the duty of obtaining 
the patient’s informed consent.”). 
119. See id. (discussing reasoning for dissent). 
120. See id. at 458–59 (arguing that requiring that physicians—and only physicians—
can obtain informed consent is inefficient and workable in a hospital setting). 
121. Id. at 458. 
122. See id. at 458–59 (arguing the practical consequences of the holding and the 
added strain the ruling places on physicians). 
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physicians and refrain from making their jobs unnecessarily more difficult.123 
IV. THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA’S IMPROPER DIAGNOSIS IN  
SHINAL V. TOMS 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s holding in Shinal is problematic 
because it sidestepped the Pennsylvania Statutory Construction Act and failed to 
grasp the strong public policy argument in favor of team-based care and delivery 
system delegation.124 
A. A Problem of Interpretation 
In deciding a statutory interpretation question, Pennsylvania courts are 
guided by the Statutory Construction Act.125  Following this Act, the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania has consistently held that the primary indication of the 
general assembly’s intent is the plain language of the statute.126  Accordingly, 
 
123. See id. at 459 (fearing the majority’s holding would slow down the already 
burdened, healthcare delivery system). 
124. See id. at 457–59 (arguing majority side-steps plain reading of the MCARE Act). 
125. See Statutory Construction Act, 1 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921 
(West 2017) (guiding a court when determining statutory interpretation issue).  Section 1921 
states: 
(a) The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and 
effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.  Every statute shall be construed, 
if possible, to give effect to all its provisions. 
(b) When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it 
is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. 
(c) When the words of the statute are not explicit, the intention of the General 
Assembly may be ascertained by considering, among other matters: 
(1) The occasion and necessity for the statute. 
(2) The circumstances under which it was enacted.  
(3) The mischief to be remedied. 
(4) The object to be attained.  
(5) The former law, if any, including other statutes upon the same or similar 
subjects. 
(6) The consequences of a particular interpretation.  
(7) The contemporaneous legislative history. 
(8) Legislative and administrative interpretations of such statute. 
Id. 
126. See In re Borough of Downingtown, 161 A.3d 844, 871 (Pa. 2017) (“The 
paramount objective of our interpretative task under the SCA is to ‘ascertain and effectuate 
the intention of the General Assembly’ in enacting the legislation under review . . . and the 
primary indication of the legislature’s intent is the plain language of the statute.” (citations 
omitted)); see also Scungio Borst & Assocs. v. 410 Shurs Lane Developers, LLC, 146 A.3d 
232, 237–40 (Pa. 2017) (analyzing a statute under the SCA); Metro. Edison Co. v. City of 
Reading, 162 A.3d 414, 421–22 (Pa. 2017) (“The best indication of the General Assembly’s 
intent is the plain language of the statute.” (citing Bayada Nurses v. Dept. of Labor & Indus., 
8 A.3d 866, 880 (Pa. 2010))); Sugarhouse HSP Gaming, L.P. v. Pa. Gaming Control Bd., 162 
A.3d 353, 375–77 (Pa. 2016) (analyzing statutory construction under the SCA); Dep’t of 
Envtl. Prot. v. Cumberland Coal, 102 A.3d 962, 975 (Pa. 2014) (“Pursuant to that Act, the 
objective of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the 
intention of the General Assembly.” (citation omitted)). 
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section 1303.504(b) of the MCARE states: “Consent is informed if the patient 
has been given a description of a procedure set forth in subsection (a) and the 
risks and alternatives that a reasonably prudent patient would require to make an 
informed decision as to that procedure.”127 
Applying section 1921 of the Statutory Construction Act, the plain language 
of the MCARE statute allows discretion in how a physician fulfills the duty of 
obtaining informed consent.128  The phrase “the patient has been given” is written 
in the passive tense, which declares that the information must be given to the 
patient; importantly, it does not mention who must give the information.129  In 
stark contrast, the section of the MCARE immediately prior—section 504(a)—
states that “a physician owes a duty to a patient to obtain the informed consent of 
the patient” before surgery.130  Therefore, if the general assembly wished to 
specifically require that only physicians could provide patients with information 
regarding consent, it very easily could have construed the statute in an identical 
manner to section 504(a), which specifically mentioned “physician.”131  
However, in drafting section 504(b), the Pennsylvania General Assembly chose 
to leave the precise method for obtaining the informed consent to the physician, 
thus, allowing the physician to decide the best way the patient should be given a 
description of the procedure, risks, and alternatives.132 
The guiding principle in the Statutory Construction Act states that “[w]hen 
the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not 
to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.”133  Therefore, under a 
plain reading of section 504(b) of the MCARE, a physician is allowed discretion 
to fulfill the duty under section 504(a) to provide informed consent.134  A superior 
court opinion written by now supreme court Justice Wecht, previously held: “We 
 
127. 40 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.504(b) (West 2017) (defining 
requirements of informed consent). 
128. See 1 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921.  The SCA calls for a 
plain-meaning reading of the MCARE Act.  Section 504(b) of the MCARE Act’s definition of 
informed consent casts patients—not physicians—as the actor that needs to receive informed 
consent.  Section 504(b) does not explicitly say a physician must obtain informed consent, but 
rather a physician’s duty is fulfilled as long as the patient gives informed consent.  Cf. 40 PA. 
STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.504(b); see also Shinal v. Toms, 162 A.3d 429, 458 (Pa. 
2017) (Baer, J., dissenting) (arguing “a prohibition on the delegation of this duty does not 
mean that a physician is precluded from utilizing a qualified member of his staff to aid in 
fulfilling the physician’s duty to obtain a patient’s informed consent”).  
129. See 40 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.504(b) (stating passive tense 
structure of the first sentence of part subsection (b)). 
130. Id. § 1303.504(a) (emphasis added). 
131. See Shinal, 162 A.3d at 457–58 (comparing the sentence structure of subsection 
504(a) and (b)). 
132. See 40 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.504(b) (describing procedures 
for physician to obtain informed consent); Shinal, 162 A.3d at 458 (arguing passive voice 
leads to an inference that the legislature intended to give discretion to the physician to decide 
how to fulfill the duty to obtain informed consent). 
133. 1 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921(b). 
134. See 40 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.504(b) (failing to specify that 
“consent is informed” if only given information by physician, thus giving discretion to 
physician to fulfill duty under section 1303.504(a)). 
21
Baker: Excuse Me, Judge, but You're Standing in the Way of My Healthcare
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2018
94 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW: TOLLE LEGE [Vol. 63: p. 73 
 
may not arrogate to ourselves some magical power judicially to ‘improve’ the 
work done by the legislature.”135  In other words, “it is not for the courts to add, 
by interpretation, to a statute, a requirement which the legislature did not see fit 
to include.”136  As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held: “where the 
legislature includes specific language in one section of the statute and excludes it 
from another, the language should not be implied where excluded.”137  Here, the 
general assembly specifically chose to leave out “physicians” from section 504(b) 
when discussing the requirements that need to be satisfied in order to fulfill the 
physician’s duty of obtaining informed consent.138 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the words of the statute are unclear, the 
Statutory Construction Act states that the intention of the general assembly may 
be ascertained by considering other matters surrounding policy, including 
legislative history.139  In the original statute, section 103 specifically stated that 
informed consent meant “consent of a patient to the performance of health care 
services by a physician or podiatrist . . . of the proposed procedure or 
 
135. Commonwealth v. Cahill, 95 A.3d 298, 303 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014).  The Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania in Cahill held that “token” is not a “ticket” under statute because of the 
express language of the statute.  See id. at 304.  The court held that if the general assembly 
intended the statute to read broadly it would have stated so in the language.  See id. at 303. 
136. Commonwealth v. Rieck Inv. Corp., 213 A.2d 277, 282 (Pa. 1965) (citations 
omitted); see also Johnson v. Lansdale Borough, 146 A.3d 696, 711 (Pa. 2016) (holding 
“when interpreting a statute we must listen attentively to what the statute says, but also to 
what it does not say” (citation omitted)); Burke ex rel. Burke v. Indep. Blue Cross, 103 A.3d 
1267, 1274 (Pa. 2014) (holding that court “may not, under guise of statutory construction, 
simply rewrite” statutory provisions); Frazier v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd., 52 A.3d 241, 
245 (Pa. 2012) (“When examining a statute, we are bound by its plain language; accordingly, 
we should not insert words into the Act that are plainly not there.” (citing Pa. Sch. Bds. Ass’n 
v. Pub. Sch. Emps.’ Ret. Bd., 863 A.2d 432, 436, 439 (Pa. 2004))); Commonwealth v. 
Scolieri, 813 A.2d 672, 678 (Pa. 2002) (stating that appellate courts should not “act as an 
editor for the General Assembly,” even where doing so would create an improved statute).  
137. Fonner v. Shandon, Inc., 724 A.2d 903, 907 (Pa. 1999) (citation omitted). 
138. See Shinal v. Toms, 162 A.3d 429, 458 (Pa. 2017) (Baer, J., dissenting) (“The 
Legislature could have, but did not, expressly require that only physicians can provide patients 
with information regarding informed consent.  Instead, the Legislature crafted the first 
sentence of Subsection 1303.504(b) in the passive voice, thus leaving open the method of 
informing a patient’s consent to the professional judgment and discretion of the physician 
charged with the duty of obtaining the patient’s informed consent.” (footnote omitted)). 
139. See 1 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921(c) (West 2017) (directing courts 
to look at other factors only when the words of statute are not explicit).  Under these other 
factors, the court is to look towards:  
(1) The occasion and necessity for the statute.  
(2) The circumstances under which it was enacted.  
(3) The mischief to be remedied.  
(4) The object to be attained.  
(5) The former law, if any, including other statutes upon the same or similar 
 subjects.  
(6) The consequences of a particular interpretation.  
(7) The contemporaneous legislative history.  
(8) Legislative and administrative interpretations of such statute. 
Id. § 1921(c)(1)–(8). 
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treatment.”140  In 1996, the statute was revised to define informed consent as “the 
consent of a patient . . . in accordance with Section 811-A.”141  Therefore, the 
earlier language—“the physician or podiatrist has informed the patient”—was 
replaced with “if the patient has been given.”142  The latter language remained in 
the latest MCARE Act at issue here.143  Thus, the revisions to the statutes show 
the General Assembly’s deliberate intentions to place the duty to obtain informed 
consent on the physician but not specify who exactly informs the patient, giving 
the physician discretion to fulfill the duty.144 
Additionally, under the plain language of the statute, delegation does not let 
the physician off the hook for liability for a failure to obtain informed consent.145  
Under section 1303.504 (d), a physician is still liable for failing to obtain 
informed consent.146  The physician has a duty to obtain informed consent but 
may delegate that duty as the physician sees appropriate; however, the physician 
 
140. See Health Care Services Malpractice Act, 1996 Pa. Laws 776, § 1. 
“Informed consent” means for the purposes of this act and of any proceedings arising 
under the provisions of this act, the consent of a patient to the performance of health 
care services by a physician or podiatrist: Provided, That prior to the consent having 
been given, the physician or podiatrist has informed the patient of the nature of the 
proposed procedure or treatment and of those risks and alternatives to treatment or 
diagnosis that a reasonable patient would consider material to the decision whether 
or not to undergo treatment or diagnosis.  
Id. (alterations omitted). 
141. Health Care Services Malpractice Act, 1996 Pa. Laws 776, § 10. 
142. Compare Health Care Services Malpractice Act, 1996 Pa. Laws 776, § 1 (noting 
old definition that required “physician or “podiatrist” to deliver informed consent), with 
Health Care Services Malpractice Act, 1996 Pa. Laws 776, § 10 (implementing amended 
definition that focuses on patient receiving informed consent).  See generally Brief for the 
American Medical Association and the Pennsylvania Medical Society as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Appellee, supra note 61, at 20 (describing change in statute language). 
143. See 40 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.504(b) (“Consent is informed if 
the patient has been given a description of a procedure set forth in subsection (a) and the risks 
and alternatives that a reasonably prudent patient would require to make an informed decision 
as to that procedure.”). 
144. See Shinal v. Toms, 162 A.3d 429, 458 (Pa. 2017) (Baer, J., dissenting) (stating 
decision of the General Assembly not to expressly require who can provide information 
regarding informed consent must not be ignored); see also Brief for the American Medical 
Association and the Pennsylvania Medical Society as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee, 
supra note 61, at 20 (“This change in language, which was continued in the MCARE Act, is 
particularly illuminating as to the question before the Court.”). 
145. See 40 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.504(d)(1), (2) (discussing 
physician’s liability for failing to obtain informed consent).  The provision states: 
(d) Liability.— 
(1) A physician is liable for failure to obtain the informed consent only if the 
patient proves that receiving such information would have been a substantial 
factor in the patient’s decision whether to undergo a procedure set forth in 
subsection (a). 
(2) A physician may be held liable for failure to seek a patient’s informed 
consent if the physician knowingly misrepresents to the patient his or her 
professional credentials, training or experience. 
Id. 
146. See id. (leaving a physician liable for failure to fulfill the duty to obtain informed 
consent). 
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retains ultimately liability under the plain language of section 1303.504(d) of the 
MCARE.147  The situation is analogous to the “captain of the ship doctrine,” 
which “imposes liability on the surgeon in charge of an operation for the 
negligence of his assistants during the period when these assistants are under the 
surgeon’s control.”148  Therefore, the plain language of the MCARE Act allows 
for delegation of the physician duty to obtain informed consent, but the physician 
maintains liability for failure to fulfill the duty.149 
B. The Policy Argument and the Future of Medical Care 
The dissent stated that the majority opinion “injects the judiciary into the 
day-to-day tasks of physicians . . . and fails to acknowledge the reality of the 
practice of medicine.”150  The reality of healthcare delivery systems is that with 
a shortage of doctors and the rise of the workforce of NPs and PAs, medical tasks 
such as diagnosis and drug prescription are now being delegated to mid-level 
health professionals.151  Following this momentum, the Pennsylvania State 
Senate recently passed a bill that would give NPs full practice authority, 
removing the mandate that required NPs to maintain written collaborative 
agreements with physicians for practice and prescription authority.152  This is just 
one example of implementation of delegation in healthcare delivery.153 
 
147. See id.; Shinal, 162 A.3d at 458 (“If qualified staff is somehow negligent in 
aiding a physician in informing a patient’s consent, then the physician remains liable if that 
negligence results in the failure to obtain the patient’s informed consent.”).  
148. Thomas v. Hutchinson, 275 A.2d 23, 27 (Pa. 1971).  See generally ADELMAN, 
supra note 67, § 12:22; KIMPFLEN & PHILBIN, supra note 67 § 37:51; LITVIN & MCHUGH, 
JR., supra note 67, § 7.8. 
149. See Shinal, 162 A.3d at 458 (“Stated succinctly, there is nothing in the law of this 
Commonwealth precluding a physician from utilizing his qualified staff to aid in his duty to 
obtain a patient’s informed consent.”); cf. PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.504(b) 
(stating informed consent doctrine in Pennsylvania). 
150. Shinal, 162 A.3d at 458. 
151. See Levi & Zehavi, supra note 9, at 227 (noting “Typical medical tasks such as 
diagnosis and drug prescription historically performed only by physicians are being delegated 
nowadays to nurses as well as to other health professionals, recasting traditional professional 
boundaries in the healthcare field.”).  
152. See S. 25, Reg. Sess. 2017–18 (Pa. 2017) (purporting to grant NPs prescriptive 
authority and removing collaborative restrictions); Terwilliger, supra note 9 (discussing 
Pennsylvania Senate Bill 25); see also Barnes, supra note 9 (discussing study finding 
removing collaborative agreement requirements for NPs would increase number of NPs in 
Pennsylvania by 13% and lower health care costs by $6.4 billion over the next ten years). 
153. See, e.g., Bowen et al., supra note 15, at 110–16 (discussing how delegation of 
nurse-led discharge can improve efficiency of patient discharge by providing services outside 
of usual time periods and allowing discharges ahead of schedule, resulting in an elimination of 
unnecessary delays in discharge); see also Beasley et al., supra note 15, at 1044–45 (arguing 
the practice of attending surgeons performing concurrent operations in two separate rooms 
with qualified surgical trainees assigned to the individual rooms improves the efficiency 
healthcare can be delivered); Lichtenstein et al., supra note 15, at 2170 (finding “[t]he 
delegation of specific processes for the management of urinary incontinence, dementia, and 
falls, to lower level providers is associated with higher quality care . . . [and] efficiency and 
quality can be improved through team care with increased delegation”). 
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Several studies have shown that delegation to NPs and PAs has little effect 
on the quality of care delivered, increases access, and potentially reduces 
healthcare costs.154  Additionally, according to some studies, PAs and NPs have 
lower rates of liability relative to physicians.155  The future of healthcare delivery 
seems to be in team-based care and in the efficient, effective use of technology 
and qualified staff to better serve an ever-growing population in need.156  The 
majority ruling puts a halt on the growing trend of team-based delegation and 
puts into question any reliance on video instructions as a tool in combination with 
others as means of obtaining informed consent.157 
Perhaps most importantly, the majority opinion ignores consumers and their 
voices in the marketplace for healthcare.158  A leading study showed that patients 
appear to be more open to a greater role for these mid-level professionals, and 
although the majority of patients would prefer a doctor, patients would rather see 
a PA than have to wait.159  Specifically imperative in the informed consent 
 
154. See Timmons, supra note 10, at 18 (concluding “that broader scope of practice 
for NPs and PAs has little effect on the quality of care delivered, increases access to health 
care, and also potentially reduces the cost of providing health care to patients”); see also 
Bauer, supra note 10, at 231 (presenting extensive evidence that NPs provide care of equal or 
better quality at lower cost than comparable services provided by other qualified health 
professionals); Horrocks et al., supra note 10, at 820–21 (concluding from eleven trials and 
twenty-three observational studies, patients were more satisfied with care by a NP, NPs had 
longer consultations, made more investigations than doctors, and quality of care in some ways 
was better for NPs); Niezen & Mathijssen, supra note 10, at 165–66 (concluding “[e]xisting 
evidence demonstrates substitution or delegation from cure to care is effective,” although 
introduction of NPs will require “organizational redesign”). 
155. See Brock et al., supra note 10, at 8, 11 (finding “[p]er capita, PAs and NPs were 
less likely to have made malpractice payments or have been subject to an adverse action than 
were physicians” and that “[t]he latest 10 years of observation is consistent with reports that 
PAs and NPs have lower reports of liability relative to their physician colleagues”). 
156. See Bodenheimer & Smith, supra note 12, at 1882 (noting “[l]icensed 
practitioners . . . [and non-licensed health care personnel] . . . are seriously underused” and 
“[a]n effective team adds capacity by sharing the care between clinicians and nonclinicians”); 
see also Gabbay et al., supra note 12, at 1 (concluding “team-based care enables physicians 
and other qualified healthcare providers to work with the patient and a multi-disciplinary team 
to coordinate and deliver high-quality health care across all settings”); Iglehart, supra note 12, 
at 1940 (finding “progress in restructuring delivery systems may come more rapidly at the 
practice level, where physicians, nurses, and other caregivers are freer to innovate and to 
assign tasks to persons on the basis of the full extent of their training and what makes 
organizational sense”).  
157. See Cordasco et al., supra note 22, at 468 (“Studies have shown that, in general, 
providing patients with simplified supplemental written materials, using decision-aids, using 
video educational tools, and using the ‘repeat-back method’ improves informed consent 
patient recall and comprehension.  Studies using interactive computer programs have had 
mixed results . . . .”). 
158. See Hooker et al., supra note 11, at 90 (“In our national cross-sectional 
satisfaction study comparing physician, PA, and NP primary care, in all indices of satisfaction 
PAs and NPs were rated as favorably as physicians.”); see also Dill et al., supra note 11, at 
1135–42 (2013). 
159. See Dill et al., supra note 11, at 1135–36 (showing greater patient openness to 
PAs and NPs); see also Frosch et al., supra note 11, at 1030–38 (finding patients felt limited, 
even trapped, into certain ways to speak with their doctors). 
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context, studies have found that patients can be more comfortable and upfront 
speaking with mid-level health professionals than the surgeon.160  If the heart of 
section 504 of the MCARE’s informed consent requirement is to ensure that a 
patient has all the necessary information in order to make an informed decision, 
then it seems vital that a patient feels comfortable enough to ask questions and 
openly discuss the procedure with a healthcare provider.161 
The majority’s abrupt ruling halting the growth of healthcare delegation 
appears inconsistent with the growing trend of research, as evidenced by the 
Pennsylvania State Senate’s Nurse Practitioner bill that was up for vote in the 
House in the Fall of 2017, which purports to expand the authority of NPs to 
increase access to care.162  Nonetheless, the public policy argument demonstrates 
that debate about the extent of healthcare delegation is better left for the 
legislature, rather than the courts.163 
V. “THE DOCTOR WILL SEE YOU IN A FEW HOURS”: THE FUTURE OF 
INFORMED CONSENT IN PENNSYLVANIA 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s holding in Shinal changes the way 
physicians must now obtain informed consent under the MCARE Act.164  
 
160. See Grumbach & Bodenheimer, supra note 11, at 1250 (“Nurse practitioners may 
also have better patient education and communication skills than do physicians.”).  
Additionally, the article cited numerous studies that suggested multidisciplinary clinical teams 
produced clinical outcomes superior to those achieved by “usual care.”  See id. 
161.  See 40 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.504(b) (West 20017) (declaring 
“[c]onsent is informed if the patient has been given a description of a procedure set forth in 
subsection (a) and the risks and alternatives that a reasonably prudent patient would require to 
make an informed decision as to that procedure”); see also Frosch et al., supra note 11, at 
1030–38 (finding patients felt limited, even trapped, into certain ways to speak with their 
doctors). 
162. See S. 25, Reg. Sess. 2017–18 (Pa. 2017) (purporting to grant NPs prescriptive 
authority and removing collaborative restrictions); see also Jaep & Bailey, supra note 9, at 14 
(suggesting “granting Pennsylvania’s nurse practitioners Full Practice Authority could 
potentially benefit Pennsylvanians by increasing access to comparable or better health care at 
lower costs”). 
163. See Shinal v. Toms, 162 A.3d 429, 458 (Pa. 2017) (Baer, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that plain meaning of the statute the legislature wrote should be effectuated); cf. Discovery 
Charter Sch. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 166 A.3d 304, 318 (Pa. 2017) (“Regardless of any policy 
reasons which may favor the creation of a mechanism through which the material terms of a 
charter can be amended, it is not the province of the judiciary to augment the legislative 
scheme.” (citation omitted)); Mohamed v. Commonwealth, 40 A.3d 1186, 1195 (Pa. 2012) 
(“Any legislative oversight is for the General Assembly to fill, not the courts.” (citation 
omitted)); Watson v. Witkin, 22 A.2d 17, 23 (Pa. 1941) (declaring “for the duty of courts is to 
interpret laws, not to make them.”). 
164. See Shinal, 162 A.3d at 455 (majority opinion) (holding a physician may not 
delegate the duty to obtain patients’ informed consent and requiring direct, face-to-face 
communication between physician and patient).  See generally Arensberg, supra note 69 
(explaining holding of Shinal); Needles, supra note 69 (discussing impact of case); 
Robeznieks, supra note 69 (discussing impact of case); Tan, supra note 69 (“The urgent 
question now is whether other jurisdictions will adopt this Pennsylvania rule that drastically 
changes the way doctors obtain informed consent from their patients.”); Wilson, supra note 69 
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Although physicians typically obtain informed consent themselves, it is often 
routine for physicians to rely on qualified staff to answer patient follow-up 
questions regarding the patient’s procedure.165  After Shinal, physicians can no 
longer rely on mid-level professionals to help them fulfill their duty to obtain 
informed consent and must personally answer all patient initial and follow-up 
questions.166  Since the holding, medical malpractice attorneys have already 
voiced concern that Shinal will lead to confusion among physicians and hospital 
administrators, delay patients access to care, and lead to an increase in informed 
consent litigation.167  On the other hand, proponents of the holding in Shinal argue 
that although the ruling may delay care, it will lead to fewer misunderstandings 
and legal disputes.168 
More immediate, the holding requires health care providers to review their 
informed consent policies and make the necessary changes to comply with the 
new ruling.169  Because the future of healthcare delivery appears to be in 
team-based care, the delegation of clinical roles to PAs and NPs, and the 
continued increase of new technologies, the issues presented in Shinal are not 
going to disappear anytime soon.170  In a time of growing physician shortages, 
 
(“While the medical field has seen a growth in the responsibilities delegated to mid-level 
providers utilized by physicians, the Shinal opinion serves as a warning to health care 
administrators that certain obligations of physicians cannot be delegated.”). 
165. See Brief for the American Medical Association and the Pennsylvania Medical 
Society as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee, supra note 61, at 24 (“It is almost 
inconceivable that a surgeon would neglect to speak with a patient about the surgery and its 
risks and alternatives, let alone surgery of this complexity and seriousness.”).  Toms, in his 
testimony, stated that before he gives surgery there is a discussion of the risks and outcomes 
and that this discussion “‘has to happen every time, does happen every time, and I can’t 
conceive of doing a case without having had that conversation.’”  Id. (citation omitted). 
166. See Shinal, 162 A.3d at 455 (holding a physician may not delegate the duty to 
obtain a patients’ informed consent and requiring direct, face-to-face communication between 
the physician and patient). 
167. See Robeznieks, supra note 69, at 4 (noting Pennsylvania Medical Society 
concern for the ruling, stating the decision “could have significant ramifications for 
Pennsylvania physicians” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also 
Mitchell, supra note 69, (finding “[s]ome attorneys are saying a new ruling on informed 
consent will sow confusion in the medical industry and lead to an uptick in legal disputes.”).  
Mitchell notes that one malpractice attorney has already seen an uptick in informed consent 
cases.  See Mitchell, supra note 69. 
168.  See Mitchell, supra note 69 (noting other medical malpractice attorneys believe 
the decisions “just clears up conflicting case law and aids in reducing the number of medical 
malpractice claims in Pennsylvania”).  The article notes that plaintiff-side medical malpractice 
attorneys believe that having more doctors addressing patients directly will lead to fewer 
misunderstandings and less litigation.  See id. 
169. See generally Jordan, supra note 69 (notifying hospital administrators in 
Pennsylvania of decision).  Jennifer Jordan, Vice President of Regulatory Advocacy for the 
Hospital Health System Association of Pennsylvania, urged hospital administrators to “review 
[their] current policies, procedures, medical staff bylaws and privileges related to obtaining 
informed consent.”  See id.  The vice president also urged hospital administrators to ensure 
their compliance procedures adhere to the opinion in Shinal.  See id. 
170. See generally Mitchell, supra note 69 (noting the waves caused by the decision 
among medical malpractice circles); see also Guest, supra note 69 (“This ruling will have a 
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the focus and momentum in informed consent may shift to what information is 
being provided and the accuracy and effectiveness of the care, rather than on who 
is providing the information.171  Beyond the political stalemate on healthcare 
reform in Washington, D.C., the problem of a shortage of doctors for the growing 
population looms in the background.172  An effective solution will rely on 
innovation in delivery systems that focus on cost-effective measures to increase 
access to care, quality of care, and efficient care.173 
 
major impact on how physicians across Pennsylvania obtain informed consent from their 
patients.”). 
171. See Brief for the American Medical Association and the Pennsylvania Medical 
Society as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee, supra note 61, at 3 (concluding the focus of 
the MCARE and the common law is on the information a patient received, rather than on the 
identity of the person providing the information). 
172. See generally Brader et al., supra note 2 (discussing current healthcare debate); 
Everett & Dawsey, supra note 2 (same); Kaplan & Sullivan, supra note 2 (same); Neuman, 
supra note 2 (same); Pear & Kaplan, supra note 2 (same); Sanger-Katz, supra note 2 (same); 
Tolbert, supra note 2 (same).  
173. See generally Brader et al., supra note 2 (discussing current healthcare debate); 
Everett & Dawsey, supra note 2 (same); Kaplan & Sullivan, supra note 2 (same); Neuman, 
supra note 2 (same); Pear & Kaplan, supra note 2 (same); Sanger-Katz, supra note 2 (same); 
Tolbert, supra note 2 (same). 
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